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ABSTRACT 
Malicious insiders account for large proportion of security breaches or other kinds of loss for 
organizations and have drawn attention of both academics and practitioners. Although methods and 
mechanism have been developed to monitor potential insider via electronic data monitoring, few studies 
focus on predicting potential malicious insiders. Based on the theory of planned behavior, certain cues 
should be observed or expressed when an individual performs as a malicious insider. Using text mining to 
analyze various media content of existing insider cases, we strive to develop a method to identify crucial 
and common indicators that an individual might be a malicious insider. 
Keywords: malicious insider, insider threat, the theory of planned behavior, text mining
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the field of information security, the subject 
of “insider threat” garners a lot of attention, yet 
has been deprived of sound empirical 
investigation.  However, there is considerable 
anecdotal mention of the insider threat issue.  In 
a recent report, the FBI noted 10 examples of 
insider attacks reported in recent years including 
the theft of trade secrets, corporate espionage, 
and the unauthorized disclosure of information 
(FBI report, 2010). These insider incidents 
resulted in financial losses in the millions of 
dollars. 
Some researchers believe that insider threat, as 
opposed to outsider attacks, is easier to achieve 
as insiders are more familiar with the security 
structure of the in organizations in which they 
work (Anderson, 1999; Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, & 
Upadhyaya, 2005). Insiders of an organizations 
either have legitimate access to organizational 
resources (Bishop, Engle, Peisert, Whalen, & 
Gates, 2009) or have knowledge about the 
operations of the organization (Probst, Hunker, 
Gollmann, & Bishop, 2010). With their 
knowledge and legitimate access, they can 
bypass security protocols and exploit the trust 
the organization has placed on them (Bellovin, 
2008). 
 
Information Age 
The information age has brought on new 
outcomes from insider threat.  Consequences of 
insider attacks have multi-dimensional loss, 
including financial loss, disruption to the 
organization, loss of reputation, and long-term 
impacts on organizational culture (Hunker & 
Probst, 2011). When compared to consequences 
of outsider attack, insider attack yields incidents  
with higher impacts (Chinchani et al., 2005) 
since insiders are familiar with countermeasures 
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of organizations and know how to find their 
targets. 
The topics of insider and insider threat have 
received significant attention from both 
practitioners and academia in the information 
age. On one hand, insider threat is considered as 
one of the most serious security concerns 
(Anderson, 1999) as noted in the results of the  
2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey 
that listed “insider threat” second only to 
computer viruses a significant security concern. 
However, insider threat has received a relatively 
low level of scientific investigation (Chinchani 
et al., 2005).  One important reason for this lack 
of attention is due to the difficulties in dealing 
with insider threat. Some of the reasons 
contributing to this gap in the research include 
lack of data for analysis and few useful methods 
for investigating the topic. As such, 
organizations employ technical controls such as 
firewalls and limit user access or order to 
prevent possible insider breaches of security.   
Unfortunately, technical controls do little to 
isolate suspicious and malicious insider 
activities without unacceptable false positive 
alarms. For example, access control based on 
authentication and authorization has an 
important assumption that insiders would always 
use legitimate privileges to perform harmful 
activities and thus be caught, but once this 
assumption is violated, access control will lose 
its power.  
Monitoring, another prevailing technique 
dealing with insider threat, is based on 
assumption that abnormal system usage 
indicates suspicious insiders. But monitoring is 
more of a post-hoc confirmation method to 
confirm already suspicious insiders of interest 
(Hunker & Probst, 2011), and thus brings into 
question if it can serve as a deterrent. (Pfleeger, 
2008) 
Technical approaches to insider threat combat 
suffer for two major shortcomings: First, 
malicious insider intention can be unobservable 
(Hunker & Probst, 2011) and behavioral patterns 
of insiders vary significantly. However, all 
insider attacks have one thing in common: they 
are performed by insiders with motivation. In a 
2005 study about insider incidents in the 
banking and financing sector Randazzo, et al. 
(2005) found that in 23 insider incidents from 
1996 to 2003, 81% incidents involved 
perpetrators were motivated by financial gains, 
other than that, 23% for revenge, 15% for 
dissatisfaction and 15% for desire for respect. 
Other research suggests that anger, resentment 
or feelings of revenge could be root causes of 
insider attacks (De Cremer, 2006). 
The extant research also tries to identify 
psychological indicators of malicious insiders’ 
motivation. Greitzer and Frincke (2010) 
developed 12 indicators of suspicious malicious 
insiders, top three of which are disgruntlement, 
accepting feedback and anger management 
issues. They also relayed that these indicators 
are fairly good predictors. However, these 
indicators are all factors which might be 
observed at workplace and assumption behind 
this is that a potential or ongoing malicious 
insider would reveal this at work. This may not 
always be the cases as disciplined insiders may 
stay “under the radar” and not exhibit such 
indicators.  Further, these indicators have yet to 
be empirically validated.  
The current state of the insider threat 
phenomenon is more oriented toward preventing 
possible perpetrators and less concerned with the 
identification and capture.  This study aims to 
advance the existing research on identifying 
malicious insiders by employing information 
technology to validate insider threat indicators 
with empirical evidence. 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: in 
the next section, we will review extant research 
on insider threat and introduce a research model 
to guide our investigation of potential indicators.   
Following that, we will discuss our data 
collection plan and methodology for analyzing 
that data.  Finally, we will conclude by 
discussing some challenges and limitations in 
our forthcoming study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we will first review definitions of 
both insider and insider threat and then the 
theory of planned behavior is discussed as 
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theoretical basis for the current research. Last 
but not the least, indicators of malicious in 
extant research are reviewed and organized into 
our framework. 
2.1 Terminology 
Insiders 
One of the challenges insider threat research is 
the lack of a widely accepted definition of 
insider. The term, insider, can be defined in 
several dimensions (Hunker & Probst, 2011): 
Access to the system: an insider is defined as 
legitimate user (Chinchani et al., 2005) who is or 
previously has been authorized the access to an 
information system. Other definitions, instead, 
extend the meaning of access to include physical 
access and, an insider is defined as having 
logical or physical access (Randazzo, Keeney, 
Kowalski, Cappelli, & Moore, 2005). 
Action based definition: “access to the system” 
definition defines who insiders are but action 
based definition defines what insiders do. 
Bishop and Gates (2008) defines an insider 
someone as who “violate security policy”. 
Intention based definition: Hayden (1999) 
defines four categories of insider: traitor, zealot, 
browser and well-intentioned insider.  Zealot 
strongly believes correctness should be made 
insider the organization; browser is a category of 
individuals who are overly curious in nature; 
traitor category includes those who have a 
malicious intent to “destroy, damage, or sell out 
their organizations”. 
Moreover in more general sense, some research 
removes information system context (Bishop, 
Gollmann, Hunker, & Probst, 2008)  and some 
combined several dimensions together, such as 
Wood’s definition which classified insider into 
different categories based on their system roles, 
intention and system consequences (Wood, 
2000). 
 As stated by Hunker and Probst (2011), the 
definition of insider highly depends on research 
questions and situations of interest. In this 
research we focus on all kinds of insiders not 
confined to the information technology context 
and all malicious actions performed by these 
insiders. For this research, we use the definition 
by Bishop and Gollmann (2008): 
An insider is a person that has been 
legitimately empowered with the right to 
access, represent, or decide about one 
or more assets of the organization’s 
structure. 
However as noted above, there exists various 
kinds of insiders and the subject of this research 
are malicious insiders, whose profiles are 
consistent with the description of Hunker and 
Probst: an individual deeply embedded in an 
organization, highly trusted and in a position to 
do great damage if so inclined.   
Insider Threat 
The definition of insider threat depends on how 
insider is defined. Intuitively, insider threat is a 
threat posed by insiders. However, this 
definition is problematic since we could not 
have clear understanding of “threat” or evaluate 
“risk” of this threat even if “insider” were well 
defined. As argued by Hunker and Probst (2011), 
each factor used to determine insider can be 
used to determine taxonomy. 
Although the majority of extant research defines 
insider threat as certain type of actions, no 
widely accepted taxonomy of insider threat 
exists. Hunker and Probst (2011) defines insider 
threats as potential misuses and actions which 
result in misuse. Chinchani and colleagues 
(2005) define insider threat as abuse of 
privileges with consequence of damage or losses. 
In other places in Chinchani’s research, insider 
threat is also defined as “violation of policies”. 
Specifically, Randazzo defines insider threat as 
actions affected the security of the organization’ 
data, system or operation (Randazzo et al., 2005).  
Other research classified insider threats into 
different categories by different factors from 
different perspectives. Based on intentions, 
insider threat is classified into malicious or 
inadvertent actions (Brackney & Anderson, 
2004). Combined with technical expertise 
dimension, actions are categorized into 
international destruction, detrimental misuse, 
dangerous tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware 
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assurance and basic hygiene (Stanton, Stam, 
Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). 
As noted in extant research, there exists various 
insiders and characteristics of insiders are 
inherently different in multi-dimensions. 
Consequently, definitions of insider threat 
depended heavily on the context of the study as 
well as research questions.  Some research 
embraces this idea and suggests defining insider 
threat in a loose and general way to avoid “fine 
nuances” (Flegel, Vayssiere, and Bitz, 2010) 
while other research defines insider threat as a 
contextual taxonomy based on characteristics of 
the individual, the organization, the system and 
the environment (Predd, Pfleeger, Hunker, & 
Bulford, 2008). 
In this research, we adopt a broad definition of 
Predd et al. (2008) as: 
Insider threat: an insider’s action that 
puts an organization or its resources at 
risk.  
Predd et al.(2008), also extends this definition 
by specifying a contextual way as shown below 
(Figure 1). This diagram states that instead of 
defining insider threat as a term including 
various types of activities in a universal way, it’s 
better to include its context, including 
organization, system, environment and 
individuals as part of its definition. However, 
they do not differentiate non-malicious or 
careless insiders from malicious insiders 
 
  Figure 1 A Framework Of Insider Threat
This definition is adopted by two reasons: 
First, Predd’s definition is consistent with our 
adopted taxonomy of insider. Research (Predd et 
al., 2008), from which we adopt definition of 
insider, defines insider threat as: 
“an insider threat is an individual with 
privileges who misuses them or whose 
access results is misuse.” 
This definition is consistent with respect to 
system usage as well as organizational 
consequence. What’s more, it broadens 
Hunker’s definition by adding context and 
offering a top-down method in order to map 
different scenarios. 
Second, Predd’s definition is consistent with our 
research question. The intended contribution of 
this study is to empirically identify common 
characteristics of malicious insiders. Our study 
focuses on identifying indicators that might help 
identify malicious insiders before they exploit 
their privileged access.     
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2.2 Criminology Theory and The Theory of 
Planned Behavior 
As stated by previous research, certain theories 
in criminology are relevant to insider threat 
detection and prevention (Hunker & Probst, 
2011) such as earlier theories of deterrence 
(Kankanhalli, et. al., 2003; Straub & Welke, 
1998), social bonds (Lee et.al., 2004), and social 
learning (Hollinger, 1993; Parker & Parker, 
1976; Skinner & Fream, 1997) which are 
integrated into the theory of planned behavior 
(Dugo, 2007; J. Lee & Lee, 2002; Peace, et.al., 
2003). 
Additionally, the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) was developed to explain and predict 
specific behaviors in a specific context (Ajzen, 
1991). According to the theory, human behavior 
is guided by three kinds of considerations: 
behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control 
beliefs (Ajzen, 1985). Behavioral beliefs are an 
individual’s expectation of outcomes and their 
evaluations of these outcomes; normative beliefs 
represent other’s expectation and individual’s 
willingness to comply with these expectations 
and the last one refers to external factors which 
facilitate individual’s intended action. From the 
framework of planned behavior, an individual’s 
behavior is the result of motivation (behavioral 
beliefs), environments (normative beliefs) and 
opportunities (control beliefs). 
The relevance of TPB is confirmed by both 
survey, in which among 23 insider incidents, 
81% of related insiders planned their job;  
(Randazzo et al., 2005), as well as by theoretical 
model which includes risk-averse nature and 
planned action as factors affecting an insider’s 
action (Wood, 2000). Further, Predd et al. 
(2008) argue that insider threat should be 
defined as specific to its context which makes it 
suitable for applying criminology into the study 
of insider threat.  
2.3 Factors Affecting Incidents of Insider 
Threat 
Based on Predd’s (2008) work, an insider’s 
actions are shaped by four factors: organization, 
individual himself/herself, environment and 
system. Organization sets up security rules and 
policy, as well as affect insider’s action via 
organization culture. System reflects 
implemented policy; environments shape and 
constrain both organizational behavior and an 
insider’s behavior through social or ethical 
norms; last but not the least, the individual’s 
motivation directly affects how he/she plans and 
mount insider attacks. In this section, we will 
start with this framework and review related 
researches about organizational factors 
(including system), the insider’s motivation and 
environmental effects.  
2.3.1 Organizational Factors 
According to Predd, organizational factors 
affecting insider threat include organizational 
security policy and organizational culture.  
Organizational security policy includes not only 
articulated policy but also implemented policy 
(the system). Besides, organizational culture 
affects insider threat via leveraging its 
employee’s awareness and compliance of 
security policy as well as its management styles. 
(1) Policy 
Three aspects of policy will influence the effect 
of policy: capability of policy language, stated 
policy and implemented policy. First, as stated 
by Hunker and Probst, (2011), capability of 
policy language is not adequate to effectively 
prevent insider threat and this is the inherent 
shortcomings of policy language. This 
disadvantage originates from complex and 
dynamic situation which policy are facing. And 
he also suggests that deployment of domain-
specified policy which could clarify situations in 
which execution could only be authorized when 
discretionary circumstances justify them. Second, 
policy taking place is not inherently the same 
kind as argued by Hunker, four hierarchy exist 
as oracle policy, feasible policy, configured 
policy and real time policy. Unawareness and 
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misunderstanding of policy hierarchy could 
result in policy absence or policy conflict. 
What’s more, policies are not always explicit but 
sometimes implicit and gap exists between 
stated policy and observed policy (Puhakainen, 
2010), which could be mitigated by security 
training programs (Vance, 2012) and increased 
participation of top managers (Hu, 2012). 
(2) Organization Culture 
Specifically, organization culture affect 
incidents of insider threat in the following 
aspects: 
First, whether security policy support or 
interfere with organizational work flow will 
affect compliance with security policy. 
Second, levels of security awareness to 
organization members will affect insider strategy 
(Hunker & Probst, 2011). Levels of security 
awareness includes perception, understanding 
and prediction (Shaw, Post, & Ruby, 1999). 
Third, organizational purpose and management 
structure will affect security structure and policy. 
 
2.3.2 Motivation of Insiders 
 
We note that extant research focusing on 
motivations of insider and insider threats does 
not differentiate terms of “psychological profile” 
and “motivation”.  The former focuses more on 
personal or internal motivations and the latter 
focuses more on goals of insiders’ actions. 
In another study, (Wood, 2000) lists four major 
goals of malicious insiders: profit; provoking 
change such as change in policy; subverting 
mission of organization; and personal goals such 
as being respected or gaining power. 
On the other hand, when considering 
psychological profile, Stolfo and colleagues 
(2008) list 10 types of motivation which might 
be most harmful: 
(1) making unintentional mistake; 
(2) trying to accomplish needed tasks; 
(3) trying to make the system do something 
for which it was not designed as a form 
of innovation to make the system more 
useful or usable; 
(4) trying innocently to do something 
beyond the authorized limit, without 
knowing the action is unauthorized; 
(5) checking the system for weakness, 
vulnerabilities or errors, with the 
intention of reporting problems 
(6) testing the limits of authorization; 
checking the system for weaknesses, 
vulnerabilities or errors, without the 
intention of reporting problems; 
(7) browsing, killing time by viewing data; 
(8) expressing boredom, revenge or 
disgruntlement; 
(9) perceiving a challenge: treating the 
system as a game to outwit; 
(10) acting with the intention of 
causing harm, for reasons such as fame, 
greed, capability, divided loyalty or 
delusion. 
Additionally,  Greitzer and Frinke (2010) 
identified several psychological indicators such 
as disgruntled, anger management issues and 
ignorance of authority,  and in a  case study 
about sabotage and espionage, common 
characteristics such as antisocial and narcissistic 
personalities have been identified (Moore, et. al, 
2008). 
 
These indicators mentioned above are just a 
small piece of the big picture. Harmful actions 
performed by insiders include espionage, 
sabotage (Gelles, 2005; Krofcheck & Gelles, 
2005) or just accidental mistakes (Predd et al., 
2008) or innocent errors (Salem, Hershkop, & 
Stolfo, 2008). Motivations of these actions are 
just as diverse as types of actions (Salem et al., 
2008). 
 
 
2.3.3 Environmental Factors 
Predd argues that environment defines whether 
an action is legal or ethical and emphasizes 
punishment enforced by law (Nance & Marty, 
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2011). What’s more, cultural differences and 
attitude toward what is appropriate will also 
affect bounds of insiders as well as definitions of 
malicious.   For example, Edward Snowden 
appears to believe he was “doing the right thing” 
when he exposed NSA information.   
As mentioned before, complex and dynamic of 
external environment will affect policy making 
as well as policy implementation (Hunker & 
Probst, 2011), as a result, affect incidents of 
insider attacks. 
2.3.4 System 
System is implemented policy (Predd et al., 
2008) and techniques  support, technically, the 
realization of security policy. Current techniques 
to mitigate insider threat include access control, 
monitoring, integrated approaches, trusted 
system and predicting model. 
2.3.4.1 Access Control 
Access control has two aspects: authentication 
and authorization. Authentication defines who 
you are and authorization defines what you can 
do. However, access control has limitations such 
as it could not prevent users who are using 
legitimate privileges to behave as malicious 
insiders. 
2.3.4.2 Monitoring 
This paper talks about two types of monitoring 
and several techniques to perform monitoring. 
These two types are misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. 
Misuse detection and modeling identifies 
defined types of misuse through rule-based 
detection. But limitation is this method could 
only detect known type of insider attack. 
Framework to perform this includes finite state 
machine, petri nets or regular expression. 
Anomaly Detection flags significant deviation 
from expected normal behavior as a proxy for 
unknown misuse. Method and theories used here 
include co-currence of multiple events, high-
order of markov chain, naïve Bayesian network. 
Problems with monitoring includes no evidence 
as deterrent and violation of privacy. 
2.3.4.3 Integrated Approaches 
Integrated approaches take combined several 
techniques together, including honey pots, 
network level sensor, physical logs, and model 
of insiders and pre-attack insiders to infer 
malicious intent. 
2.3.4.4 Trusted System 
Key characteristic of trusted system is reference 
validation (Neumann, 2010): each execution 
could be tracked back to specific users. This 
characteristic makes trusted system as resistant 
to insiders as well as to outsiders. In operations, 
a trusted system is implemented by isolating 
executing privilege domains with less privilege 
domains, isolating one user’s access from 
another user’s access (Saltzer, 1974) or 
assigning user specific random domains 
(Neumann, 2010). 
2.3.4.5 Predicting Model 
Predicting model uses system usage as 
predictors of insider attacks, such as inconsistent 
digital behaviors (Dimkov, 2011) and unusual 
access (Probst, 2009).  
3. INTRODUCTION OF RESEARCH 
MODEL 
In this section, we will first build our model 
based on the planned behavior theory and other 
related theories and research. Then constructs 
and their corresponding measures will be 
discussed. 
3.1 Model Derivation 
There has been a considerable amount of work 
with respect to individual motivations in the 
literature.  Researchers from various disciplines 
propose that the constructs depicted in the table 
are indicators of insider threat.  As noted, our 
motivation is to validate those constructs.  
Figure 2 shows our model derived from the 
Theory of Planned Behavior, in which insider 
threat incident behavior is preceded by three 
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constructs: attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control. 
  
 
Figure 2: Research Model    
3.1.1 Attitude Attitude refers to “the degree to which a person 
has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or 
Identifying Common Characteristics of Malicious Insiders 2015 CDFSL Proceedings 
© 2015 ADFSL Page 169 
appraisal of the behavior in question” (Ajzen, 
1991).  
Internal as well as insider’s perception about 
external factors would affect the insider’s 
attitude towards what he or she is doing or plan 
to do. From previous literature, factors affecting 
an insider’s attitude towards himself or herself 
include both internal and external factors:  
3.1.1.1 Internal Factors 
(1) Self-image (Loch & Conger, 1996; 
Randall,1989) 
(2) Deindividuation (Lee & Lee, 2002; Loch & 
Conger, 1996) 
(3) Commitment to organization (Dugo, 2007;  
Lee & Lee, 2002; Li,et al., 2010) 
(4)Beliefs (Loch &Conger,1996; Vance, 
et,al., ,2012;) 
(5) Psychological Indicators (Greitzer & Frincke, 
2010; Moore et al., 2008) 
3.1.1.2 External Factors or Insider’s 
Perception about External Factors 
 (1) Perceived punishment severity and 
perceived punishment certainty (Cox, 2012; 
Dugo, 2007; Ifinedo, 2012; Li, et.al., 2010; 
Peace et al., 2003; Peach, et al., 2010; Son, 
2011; Vance,et,al., 2012) 
(2) Security culture (Hu et. al., 2012) 
(3) Organizational culture (Cox, 2012; Hu et al., 
2012) 
3.1.2  Subjective Norm 
Subjective norm is a social factor and refers to 
“perceived social pressure to perform or not to 
perform or not to perform the behavior”(Ajzen, 
1991). Therefore, in the context of insider threat 
research, subjective norm is specified as how co-
workers and senior works feel about insiders’ 
actions (Lee & Lee, 2002).  
But in this research, we extend Lee’s scope of 
subjective norm to include influences from 
family or any other sources, not limited to 
influences exerted from workplaces. 
3.1.3 Perceived Behavioral Control 
Perceived behavioral control refers to people’s 
perception of the ease or difficulty of performing 
the behavior of interest (Ajzen, 1991). 
Although in the theory of planned behavior, 
perceived behavioral control is one predictor of 
intention of behavior, actual level of behavioral 
control was also used as a predictor (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). In Bulgurcu’s 
research, number of security staffs and number 
of security systems in use are used as predictor 
of IT security policy compliance behavior. 
Predicting power of actual behavioral control is 
also confirmed by Ajzen (1991), one of the 
builder of the theory of planned behavior, 
arguing perceived behavioral control serves as a 
proxy for actual behavioral control. 
Factors affecting perceived behavioral control in 
existing research include: 
(1) punishment certainty (Peace et al., 2003) 
(2) security policy and security systems(Lee 
& Lee, 2002) 
(3) locus of control (Cox, 2012) 
3.2 Definition of Constructs  
There has been a considerable amount of work 
with respect to individual motivations in the 
literature.  Researchers from various disciplines 
propose that the constructs depicted below.  As 
noted, our motivation is to validate those 
constructs.   
3.2.1 Self-image 
In previous research, demographic 
characteristics of insiders include gender, age, 
education, socioeconomic status, religion, 
marriage status, professions and position in 
organization (Randall, 1989). And self-image is 
the characteristic an individual defines himself 
or herself (Loch & Conger, 1996). As argued by 
Loch & Conger, if an individual defines himself 
or herself by religion, he or she is mostly likely 
to comply with rules of that religion. Therefore, 
characteristic used by individual to define 
himself or herself serves as one measure of his 
or her attitude. 
3.2.2 Deindividuation 
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Deindividuation is first defined as a feeling of 
“being estranged or separated from others that 
can lead to behavior violating established norms 
of appropriateness” (Zimbardo, 1969). What’s 
more, it is widely used in insider threat 
researches as an antecedent of insider threat (Lee 
& Lee, 2002; Loch & Conger, 1996). People 
with deindividuation has less interaction with 
others and will be less likely to perform socially 
accepted behaviors. 
3.2.2 Perceived Punishment 
Severity/Certainty 
 
If an individual’s perceived punishment severity 
is high and perceived probability to be 
discovered is high, he or she would perceived a 
high level of behavioral control. 
3.2.3 Commitment to Organization/Beliefs 
Commitment to organization refers to “one is 
committed to conformity by not only what one 
has but also what one hopes to attain” (Hirschi, 
2002). And beliefs refer to strength of 
individual’s feeling about whether he or she 
should comply with organizational rules. 
Therefore, the more an individual is committed 
to organization, the less likely he or she is to 
commit malicious threat to organization (Dugo, 
2007; Lee & Lee, 2002). 
3.2.4 Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture refers to whether the 
organization is goal-oriented or rule-oriented. 
For a goal-oriented organization, insiders 
comply with organization by fulfilling 
organizational goals, however, rule-oriented 
organization requires insiders comply with 
procedures and regulations (Cox, 2012; Hu et al., 
2012). 
3.2.5 Security Policy and Systems 
Security policy and security systems refer to 
official and implemented security policies in 
organization. Quality of security-whether stated 
policy covers potential risk emerging area-as 
well as implemented policy-how many security 
systems are used- will affect organizational 
security level (Hu et. al. 2012). 
3.2.6 Psychological Indicators 
Twelve psychological indicators are suggested 
by Greitzer & Frincke (2010) as shown in Table 
1: 
 
Table 1 Psychological Indicators 
Indicator Description 
Disgruntlement Employee observed to be dissatisfied in current position. 
Accepting Feedback The employee is observed to have a difficult time accepting criticism. 
Anger Management 
Issues 
The employee often allows anger to get pent up inside. 
Disengagement The employee keeps to self, is detached, withdrawn and tends not to interact 
with individuals or groups; avoid meetings. 
Disregard for authority The employee disregards rules, authority or policies. 
Performance The employee has received a corrective action based on poor performance. 
Stress The employee appears to be under physical, mental or emotional strain or 
tension that he or she has difficulty handling. 
Confrontational 
Behavior 
Employee exhibits argumentative or aggressive behavior or is involved in 
bullying or intimidation. 
Personal Issues Employee has difficulty keeping personal issues separate from work. 
Self-Centeredness The employee disregards needs or wishes of others, concerned primarily 
with own interests and welfare. 
Lack of Dependability Employee is unable to keep commitments or promises; unworthy of trust. 
Absenteeism Employee has exhibited chronic unexplained absenteeism. 
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4. Methodology 
As noted above, previous research often focuses 
on preventing insider incidents as opposed to 
actually identifying malicious insiders.  Further, 
while some malicious insider characteristics 
have been proposed, many have not had to stand 
the scrutiny of empirical investigation.   We aim 
to close these gaps by using text mining and 
classification to exam third party data; namely 
past reports on captured malicious insiders and 
empirically examine their characteristics.  Then 
we intend to use those empirically supported 
characteristics in an attempt to better predict and 
identify potential malicious insiders.  
 
4.1 Data Sample 
Data used in this study are mainly from two 
sources: public reports and previous research. 
We will begin by text mining public reports for 
keywords of name (the insider) involved in 
discovered insider incidents.   Once we identify 
a satisfactory number of cases, we will then text-
mine for indicators of the characteristics posited 
by previous research.    
4.2 Research Methods 
The method we propose to use in this research is 
based on the process introduced by Greitzer and 
Frincke (2010). In this process, data collected is 
first refined into observations and then these 
observations are clustered into different 
indicators. In this section, we first briefly 
introduce Greitzer and Frincke’s information 
extraction model and then specify the process 
and method we will use in this research. 
4.2.1 Introduction of the Method 
   
 
In Greitzer and Frincke’s (2010) approach data 
in the form of text based reports is collected. 
Data represents direct available information 
about activities of individuals such as timecard 
records, VPN login records and so on. When 
these data are collected, algorithms will be 
employed to calculate observations.  Fuller, et. 
al. (2009) demonstrated how decision tress, 
neural networks, and logistic regression can be 
used in similar law enforcement cases.  
Once the data is mined and classified, 
observations can be made.  Observations are 
inferences from data to reflect a certain state. In 
previous example, timecard records (data) and 
VPN login could be used to calculate Time At 
Work (observation).   From observations, 
indicators can be derived. Indicators are referred 
to actions or events that are precursors of a 
certain behavior. In previous examples, unusual 
late work hour (indicator) could be derived from 
time at work (observation). 
4.2.2 Extension of Previous Method 
In this research, our interest has a wider 
perspective including but not limited to 
psychological indicators of malicious insiders as 
Greitzer and Frincke (2011) did. Therefore, we 
extend the scope in terms of data, observation 
and indicator, but stay with the framework. 
We intend to use direct descriptions about extant 
malicious insiders from public reports, national 
or local media, and previous research as raw 
data in our current study. These unstructured 
data are processed into structural observations 
using information extraction text-mining. In this 
process, heuristic methods are employed: we 
mine and extract descriptions of malicious 
insiders and refined them into observations (a 
reflection of certain characteristic or state of 
insider), then the next piece of data is processed. 
If the observation extracted from data already 
exists (i.e., has already been identified), then a 
new record of that observation is added to the 
others.  However, if the item has not yet been 
observed then a new observation will be created 
and recorded.  
A major difference between our method and 
Greitzer’s method is that indicators in our 
research are not refined and extracted from 
observations, but instead they are predefined by 
previous research. Therefore, observations are 
clustered into indicators specified in Section 3 
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using clustering text mining techniques.   
However, we note that having predefined 
observations will not precluded use from 
identifying potential new observations, and we 
expect to find some.  Modern text mining and 
classification techniques are quite powerful and 
can yield results not found by human 
observation (Fuller, et al., 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
The problem of malicious insider threat is of 
concern to practitioners and academic alike, yet 
the phenomenon has yet to be significantly 
examined beyond the domains of psychology 
and criminal science where mainly human 
observation is the only means of data collection.  
We aim to employ a form of data mining, 
namely text mining along with observation 
classification to expand and aggregate finding 
from multiple historical insider threat cases.   In 
doing so, we believe we can develop better 
indicators for identifying the characteristics of 
malicious insiders.   However, our work has just 
begun.  Our next step is to collect cases of 
malicious insider threat and all reports and 
articles covering each case.   Then, we will 
employ our text-mining and classification 
techniques identified above to validate the 
indicators derived from previous research and 
possible identify additional indicators.  Finally, 
we hope to build a common set of validated 
indictors of malicious insiders.   We hope this 
proposed method will garner discussion and 
endorsement from other researchers pursuing 
and solution to the insider threat problem.    
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